BY DAVID RAY GRIFFIN
It seems widely assumed that any such case [for government
complicity in 9/11] can be rejected a priori by pointing out that it is a
"conspiracy theory". Indeed, it almost seems to be a requirement of
admission into public discourse to announce that one rejects conspiracy
theories. What is the logic behind this thinking? It cannot be that we literally
reject the very idea that conspiracies occur. We all accept conspiracy theories
of all sorts. We accept a conspiracy theory whenever we believe that
two or more people have conspired in secret to achieve some goal, such as to rob
a bank, defraud customers or fix prices. We would be more honest, therefore, if
we followed the precedent of Michael Moore, who has said: "Now, I’m not
into conspiracy theories, except the ones that are true."
To refine this point slightly, we can say that we accept all
those conspiracy theories that we believe to be true, while we reject all
those that we believe to be false. We cannot, therefore, divide people into
those who accept conspiracy theories and those who reject them. The
division between people on this issue involves simply the question of which
conspiracy theories they accept and which ones they reject.
Plausible vs. Implausible
To refine the point a little more: There are some conspiracy
theories that, although we may not be convinced of their truth, we find
at least plausible, so we are willing to entertain the possibility that
they might be true. We are open, accordingly, to reading and hearing evidence
intended to support them.
There are other conspiracy theories, by contrast, that we
find completely implausible, so we tend to suspect the intelligence or
sanity of people who believe them or who even entertain the possibility of their
truth. Whatever facts they offer as evidence we reject out of hand, holding
that, even if we cannot explain these facts, the true explanation cannot be the
one they are offering. But the question of what we find completely implausible
– "beyond the pale" – is seldom determined simply by a
dispassionate consideration of empirical evidence.
Plausibility is largely a matter of one’s general world
view. We are also influenced to some degree by wishful-and-fearful thinking, in
which we accept some ideas partly because we hope they are true and reject other
ideas because we would find the thought that they are true too frightening. At
least sometimes, however, we are able, in spite of our prejudgments, to revise
our prior ideas in light of new evidence. Most revisionists about 9/11, in
presenting their evidence, seem to be counting on this possibility.
Applied to 9/11: Evidence is the Key
To apply this analysis to the attacks of 9/11: it is false to
suggest that those who allege that the attacks occurred because of official
complicity are "conspiracy theorists", while those who accept the
official account are not. People differ on this issue merely in terms of which
conspiracy theory they hold to be true, or at least most probable.
According to the official account, the attacks of 9/11 occurred because of a
conspiracy among Muslims, with Osama bin Laden being the chief conspirator.
Revisionists reject that theory, at least as a sufficient account of what
happened, maintaining that the attacks cannot be satisfactorily explained
without postulating conspiracy by officials of the US government, at least in
allowing the attacks to succeed. The choice, accordingly, is simply between
(some version of) the received conspiracy theory and (some version of)
the revisionist conspiracy theory.
Which of these competing theories we accept depends, or at
least should depend, on which one we believe to be better supported by the
relevant facts. Those who hold the revisionist theory have become convinced that
there is considerable evidence that not only suggests the falsity of the
received conspiracy theory, which we are calling "the official
account," but also points to the truth of the revisionist theory.
Excerpted (with permission) from The
New Pearl Harbor by David Ray Griffin, pp. xxiv & 206, Olive Branch
Press, 2004.